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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, real estate opportunity fund returns were analyzed for evidence of 
persistence in subsequent funds from the same manager; it is designed to update and enhance a 
prior thesis performed by Cathy C. Hahn (2003), using both parametric and non-parametric tests.  
Tests were performed on gross and net returns covering the period from 1991-2004. 
 These tests confirm the prior finding that past fund performance is a significant indicator 
of future fund performance within the same firm.  Our study also found the strongest evidence of 
persistence to exist in the extreme performers ranking in the top and bottom quartile amongst 
their vintage year peers.  Additional tests for persistence, as well as effects of fund characteristics 
on performance, were employed using a methodology similar to that performed on private equity 
funds by Kaplan and Schoar (2003).  Our tests yielded similar results to those found by Kaplan 
and Schoar(2003), but were not substantiated with statistical significance.   
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I. Introduction 
 
The real estate opportunity fund industry has grown tremendously over the last decade.  
Equity commitments have increased from $4.7 billion in 1993 to almost $100 billion in 2002.1  
Despite the increase in capital commitments, and the relative importance to investors and the 
economy as a whole, little research has been conducted on the returns of these investments.  One 
major obstacle in performing the research is the lack of available public data.  Proprietary data 
covering virtually the entire existence of the industry (1991-2003) has been provided for this 
thesis by Pension Consulting Alliance. 
This thesis is designed to update and enhance a prior MIT thesis titled “Real Estate 
Opportunity Funds: Past Fund Performance as an indicator of Subsequent Fund Performance” 
(Cathy C. Hahn 2003).    Both parametric and non-parametric tests will be performed to 
determine if managers are able to obtain a constant alpha in their subsequent funds, producing 
serial performance correlation.  “Alpha” is defined as the abnormal return of an investment, 
either excess or deficient return.  The capital asset pricing model states that the expected value of 
alpha is zero, and that sample alphas should be unpredictable.2  Due to the private nature of the 
real estate market it seems possible for firms to achieve constant alpha as they locate and 
capitalize on over-discounted risk or overlooked value enhancement opportunities to reach their 
target investment returns.  This thesis also examines other factors to determine their affect on 
performance such as: historical and current fund size, fund sequence number, and the effect of 
subsequent fund growth.   
 
 
                                                 
1 Pension Consulting Alliance, “Real Estate Opportunity Funds: Déjà vu All Over Again,”May 2003, p.5. 
2 Zvi Bodie, Alex Kane, and Alan Marcus, Investments, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002) p.303 
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II. Literature Review 
 
Mutual Funds 
Most studies related to performance persistence have been performed on the mutual fund 
industry.  These studies generally find evidence of persistence in mutual fund returns, with the 
strongest evidence occurring in the short term and with poor performance [eg. Hendricks, Patel, 
and Zeckhauser (1993), Shukla and Trzcinka (1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Carhart et 
al. 1996)]. 
Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) studied patterns in mutual fund returns over the short-
term. Two-way contingency tables using returns and alphas (the excess return divided by the 
amount of associated risk) were constructed for the fund returns over one-year, two-year, and 
monthly periods.  Evidence of persistence was strongest in the monthly periods; regression 
analysis confirmed the results.  
 Carhart (1997) studied other factors that could contribute to the serial correlation in 
mutual fund returns.  Carhart concluded that persistence was only evident in poor performing 
funds, which could be caused by illiquid under performing stocks.   
 
Pension Funds   
Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman (1998) studied the evidence of persistence in the 
relative investment performance of large, institutional equity mangers.  They used a conditional 
approach with time-varying measures of risk and abnormal performance, which they found to be 
a better method of detecting the persistence than traditional approaches.  Persistence was 
measured using cross-sectional regressions of future excess returns on past excess returns (or 
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alpha).  Similar to the evidence of persistence found in mutual funds, the study concluded that 
persistence is concentrated in the poorly performing managers. 
 
Private Equity 
A working paper by Kaplan and Schoar (2003) studies the characteristics of fund 
performance in the private equity industry, appearance of persistence in fund performance, and 
the relation of fund performance to capital flows, fund size and overall fund survival.  
Regression analysis was performed using various fund characteristics and historical fund returns, 
while controlling for year and firm fixed effects.  The study concludes that returns persist 
strongly across funds raised by the same firms.  Not only was persistence evidenced between the 
first fund and subsequent fund, but also between the current fund and the second previous fund.  
The study also showed that performance increases with fund size and experience (subsequent 
funds have higher returns).   The relation between fund size and performance is concave, 
suggesting fund performance increases with size until it becomes a mega-funds, at which time its 
returns decrease.  This is different from the mutual fund industry, where the size to performance 
relationship is convex.    The study also found that funds raised and started in boom3 times are 
less likely to raise follow-on funds, which is attributed to poor performance.   
 
 
III. Data 
 
The collection of data for this thesis has been kindly provided by PENSION 
CONSULTING ALLIANCE Inc.4 Pension Consulting Alliance (PCA) collects information on 
                                                 
3 Boom times are determined when the S&P 500, Nasdax Composite Index and venture industry returns are high for 
the current and prior year. 
4 Pension Consulting Alliance Inc. : www.pensionconsulting.com  
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real estate opportunity fund returns, as they provide advisory services for most of the main 
institutional investors in the industry.  Their data set is based on voluntary reporting by the fund 
managers, in this case focusing on real estate opportunity funds5.  All of the firm identities have 
been withheld to protect confidentiality. 
 The data set herein examines firms with vintage years between 1991 and 2004. Cathy C. 
Hahn used a previous version of the database with returns through vintage year 2001 in her 2003 
study referenced above.  The rapid growth of the opportunity fund industry can be clearly seen in 
the sharp increase in the number of funds created in later years.  From the original data set with 
43 managers and 110 funds started between 1991 and 2001, PCA has increased their sample to 
65 managers and 200 funds started through 2004. 
The data set was cleared from 55 incomplete questionnaires. Of those deleted funds, 32 
correspond to new reported funds between 2002-2004, for which there is no performance 
measure since deployment of the capital has not yet been realized.  Of the remaining funds, only 
18 firms (35% of the population) had raised one single opportunity fund.  In fact, of the 51 firms 
finally analyzed, 24 of them (47% of the set) have managed three or more funds in the 
considered period. The data reveals the spectacular growth in the number of opportunity funds 
originated, growing from the 2 funds reported in 1991 to the 23 funds documented in 1998. In 
the later years, we see a sharp diminution in the number of funds and total capital, however this 
is probably due to the data clearing of the uncompleted questionnaires. 
  
                                                 
5 More detailed background on real estate opportunity funds and survivorship/selection bias can be found in Cathy 
Hahn, “Real Estate Opportunity Funds: Past Fund Performance as an indicator of subsequent fund performance”, 
MS thesis, MIT, 2003, pp. 6-12. 
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The total investment in Real Estate opportunity funds considered in the analyzed data adds up to 
79 Billion US$ once cleared of the uncompleted questionnaires6. 
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The performance data disclosed by PCA falls into two mayor categories: (1) performance 
measures from funds that have been liquidated, and (2) the performance measures estimated by 
the managers of funds that are still active. As discussed by Cathy Hahn, the performance data of 
                                                 
6 Considering even the incomplete data, the committed capital adds up to over a $100 Billions in the 1991-2004 
period. 
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funds still active represent an added difficulty, since the valuation of the residual asset is 
calculated with heterogeneous criteria.  
 Opportunistic real estate funds share a common characteristic with general private equity 
funds: being highly illiquid and not subject to constant market valuation (as is the case with 
mutual funds). Thus, the performance of a fund is characterized by a single return measure, 
which is calculated at the end of the end of the life of the fund.  The returns provided by PCA 
data set are either Gross Internal Rate of Return (IRR) or IRR Net of management fees and 
carried interests. Only 4% of the funds report negative gross results, but once fees are deducted, 
9% of the funds end up with losing Net IRRs.  
Gross IRR. All Data Histogram
0
20
40
60
80
ne
ga
t - 
0%
0 -
 15
%
15
 - 3
0%
30
 - 4
5%
45
 - 6
0%
60
 - 7
5%
Fr
ec
ue
nc
y
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
Frecuency % cumulative
 
 
The overall Average Gross IRR for the set is 24%, falling to an Average Net IRR of 15%, 
which is in line with the general expectations of the capital market for such opportunistic funds. 
Average Performance of funds also varies across time through the period of study.  Again, in the 
early years, and again in the later years, we find surprising returns due to the limited number of 
data points.  
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Vintage 
Year 
Average 
Gross IRR 
Average 
Net IRR 
Weighted Avg. 
Gross IRR 
Weighted Avg. 
Net IRR 
1991 38% 35% 43% 40% 
1992 22% 18% 22% 18% 
1993 32% 28% 26% 24% 
1994 21% 18% 20% 17% 
1995 22% 17% 20% 12% 
1996 16% 11% 16% 9% 
1997 10% 8% 7% 6% 
1998 14% 10% 13% 9% 
1999 35% 16% 16% 6% 
2000 30% 22% 33% 23% 
2001 31% 12% 38% 22% 
2002 33% 15% 47% 21% 
2003 104% 84% 104% 84% 
2004 20% 9% 20% 9% 
 
The size of each fund, in the form of Total Committed Capital, is also reported in the data 
set. Over 1/3 of the funds subsequently raised by a firm decrease in size from its previous fund. 
Another ¼ of the funds raised represent an increase from a previous fund of up to 50%. The 
remaining 38% of the funds experiment an explosive growth above 1.5 times the previous fund. 
Furthermore, 47 funds of the total data set have a subsequent fund that, at the very least will 
duplicate them in size. 
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IV. Prior Results and Methodology: (As Documented in Prior Thesis by Cathy 
C. Hahn (2003) 
 
This thesis is being performed to update and enhance a prior MIT thesis: “Past Fund 
Performance as an indicator of Subsequent Fund Performance” (Cathy C. Hahn 2003).    The 
 13
prior thesis was based on similar data set provided by Pension Consulting Alliance, with data 
consisting of 43 managers and 110 funds started between the years 1991-2001.  The 
methodology used in her thesis utilized both parametric and non-parametric tests.  The 
parametric tests consisted of regressing fund performance on past fund performance (normalized 
ranking based on vintage year pears), as well as other fund characteristics as independent 
variables.  Non-parametric tests included analyzing the Spearmen rank correlation coefficient 
and the Kendall coefficient, as well as constructing and analyzing contingency tables with the 
chi-squared test and cross-contingency tables.   A detailed description of the tests mentioned 
above can be found in the methodology section of this thesis.  The tests were performed on all of 
the data, as well as funds with a vintage year from 1991-1997, when appropriate.  Limiting the 
data set to funds with a vintage year 1991-1997 allows for a more reliable measure of returns, but 
significantly reduces the sample size.  Some of the key findings from the prior thesis are 
summarized below. 
 The Spearmen rank correlation was conducted using subsequent pairs of funds.  The 
results of the Spearman rank correlation indicated a strong correlation between rankings for both 
net and gross IRR resulting in the null hypothesis of no persistence to be rejected at a 99% 
confidence level.   Similar results were achieved when the data set was limited to funds from 
1991-1997.  However, the null hypothesis could not be rejected when pairs were separated by a 
five-year lag.  The analysis was then performed with Kendall’s Tau and it produced similar 
results rejecting the null hypothesis at a 99% confidence interval.  This test was not reproduced 
in this thesis due to the fact little enhancement would be achieved. 
 Contingency tables were then constructed using normalized rank and were assigned a 
Win/Loss rating based on their relation to the median ranking of their peers.   The data produced 
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68 pairs when using all the reported funds and 23 pairs when using only funds with a vintage 
year between 1991-1997.  The chi-squared test rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation in 
fund returns at the 99% confidence level when using pairs of all funds, and 97% confidence 
when restricting the data to vintage years 1991-1997. 
The parametric test results also showed strong evidence of persistence.  The first test 
regressed a fund’s ranking on the ranking of the firm’s previous fund, testing the null hypothesis 
that a fund’s return is independent from the performance of the previous fund within the same 
firm.  The results are strongly significant on both the gross and net numbers and the null 
hypothesis of no persistence can be rejected at the 99% confidence level.  Limiting the funds to 
those with vintage years between 1991-1997 produces strong results as well.  The null 
hypothesis can be rejected at the 99% confidence level for gross, and the 95% level for net 
returns.  The adjusted R-square indicates as much as 24% of a fund’s performance ranking is 
related to the performance of its manager’s previous fund.  When regressing the rankings of the 
previous two funds (Rt-1, Rt-2), the null hypothesis of no persistence can be rejected at the 90% 
confidence level for all cases with the exception of the analysis on gross IRR for all years.  The 
coefficient for the t-1 coefficient is positive while the coefficient for the t-2 fund is negative.   
 
V. Methodology 
  
 Various parametric and non-parametric tests have been used in the past to detect 
performance persistence in returns of various investment vehicles.  This study incorporates 
methodology from the prior thesis (Hahn 2003) and contributes additional analysis in order to 
enhance and expand the results.  Due to the fact that there is only one performance measure 
(IRR) for each fund, the analysis is based on the on the relationship between performance of one 
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fund and the performance of a subsequent fund of the same firm.  Results of the tests previously 
performed in the prior thesis are also of interest, as a point of comparison, due to the increase in 
data and the addition of subsequent funds by the same manager.   
The tests were run on both gross and net returns of the entire database and on data with 
vintage years from 1991-1997, when the sample size was deemed large enough.  The funds with 
a vintage year of 1991-1997 are at or nearing the end of their life cycle, and therefore the 
reported returns have a higher probability of being realized, and are not based on manager’s 
projections.  However, limiting the data to the early year funds significantly reduces the data set.       
Many of the firms report more than one fund with the same vintage year.  Due to this 
factor, our analysis is performed at two different levels.  The first being what we refer to as the 
“firm” level.  When performing analyses at the firm level, returns and fund size from all funds 
started by a firm during a particular vintage year are averaged prior to being paired with a 
subsequent fund for analysis (example: Firm A started funds 1 and 2 during 1999 and funds 3 
and 4 in 2001.  Returns and commitment size from funds 1 and 2 would be averaged then paired 
with the average of funds 3 and 4.)  The other level of analysis is what we refer to as the “fund” 
level.  When performing analyses at the fund level, all possible combinations of pairs are made 
between funds of subsequent years (For example: Firm A starts funds 1 and 2 in 1999 and funds 
3 and 4 in 2001.  The funds are then arranged to make the following pairs 1-3, 2-3,1-4, 2-4).  It is 
recognized that the multiple funds started by a firm in a single vintage year could be the result of 
funds with differentiated investment criteria or a fund raised for co-investment.7  In either case, 
the funds are treated as separate funds because of the difference in strategy and exposure.   In the 
prior thesis there were only a few instances of multiple funds originated in the same year.  In 
                                                 
7 A co-investment fund would consist of a fund raised to purchase a single asset due to exposure constraints of a 
diversified fund.   The equity interest in the project could be split between the two funds. 
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those rare cases the returns were averaged which make them comparable (although not exact) to 
the firm level analysis performed in this thesis. 
 In order to allow the funds to be compared across different vintage years, the funds are 
ranked in comparison to their vintage year peers.  The funds are given an absolute rank based on 
IRR with a rank of one being assigned to the highest IRR for that year.  The absolute rankings 
are then normalized by using the equation: 
    NR = (n-r)/(n-1) 
where n equals the number of funds in the given vintage year and r equals to the absolute rank of 
the fund.  Rankings were assigned for both net and gross IRR’s.  In the “firm” level analysis 
where a firm has more than one fund in a given vintage year, the returns are averaged prior to 
being ranked.  If there is only one fund in a vintage year, a normalized rank of .5 is awarded. 
 
Contingency Tables 
The first non-parametric test is the construction of contingency tables and application of 
the chi-squared test and the cross-contingency tables, which was part of the methodology 
employed in the prior thesis.  This methodology has also been used in many other past studies of 
persistence such as Brown and Goetzmann (1995).   The funds are organized into pairs, where 
the ranking of a firm’s given fund is paired a subsequent fund from the same firm.  The pairs are 
compiled at both the “firm” and “fund” level described above.  
The first test analyzes how a fund’s normalized ranking compares to the median ranking 
of the additional funds in their given vintage year.  If a fund finished above the median, it was 
assigned a rating of “Win”, and if the fund was at or below the median, it was rated a “Loss”.  
The pairs were then assembled in a table based on the ranking of each fund in the pair: win/win. 
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win/lose, lose/win or lose/lose.  A control matrix is then assembled by calculating the expected 
frequency if the outcomes were completely independent.  The two tables are then analyzed using 
the chi-squared test to determine if the deviation from the expected frequency is statistically 
significant. 
 Additional tests were then performed to analyze persistence in the extremities of the 
rankings.  An analysis was performed, awarding a “win” to those funds with a ranking in the top 
quartile (normalized ranking greater than or equal to .75), and a “lose” was given to the funds 
with a ranking in the bottom quartile (normalized ranking less than or equal to .25).  If a firm 
earned a ranking placing them in either of the middle quartiles (greater than .25 or less than .75) 
it was assigned a rating of NS.  Only the funds in the top or bottom quartile are paired with a 
subsequent fund, as we were specifically interested in the extreme performers.  If a pair was 
awarded a win/ns or a lose/ns rating, it was assigned to the win/lose or lose/win quadrant in the 
contingency table.  The results were then compared with the expected frequency using the chi-
squared test.  The test was also performed using the top third (greater than or equal to .66) and 
the bottom third (less than or equal to .33) as the win/lose criteria. 
 
Regression Analysis 
The first step of our regression analysis was to recreate some of the significant 
regressions previously performed by Cathy C. Hahn in the previous thesis, using the recent data.  
The first regression was performed by regressing the ranking of a fund onto the existence of a 
previous fund.  A dummy variable was constructed to signal if the subject fund was the first fund 
originated by the firm.  The formula for the regression is as follows: 
   NR (Normalized Rank) = α + βEF 
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where EF represents a dummy variable for the presence of an existing fund.  This tests to see if a 
firm’s lack of previous experience is affecting their returns in relation to their peers.   
 The next set of regressions is based on lagged performance.  The first regression was 
performed by regressing the funds performance on the ranking of the firm’s previous fund (LR).  
The equation for the regression is: 
   NR = α + LRβ 
where NR equals normalized rank and LR equals the normalized rank of the preceding fund from 
the same firm.  The analysis was repeated by regressing the funds ranking on the ranking of the 
firms previous two fund.  The equation for the regression is: 
NR = α + LRβ + LLRδ 
where NR again signifies normalized rank, LR represents the lagged rank from the firm’s 
previous fund and LLR represents the ranking from the fund that precedes LR.  A final 
regression was performed using at least a five-year lag.  This paired a fund with a subsequent 
fund that was originated at least five years later.  These regressions allowed us to test if past 
performance is positively correlated to future performance by the appearance of a positively 
signed coefficient on the independent variable.  The different time periods used allow us to test 
for persistence in both the short and long-term.   
 Additional regression analysis was also performed based on the methodology employed 
in the working paper by Kaplan and Schoar (2003), testing for persistence in private equity 
funds.  The first step of the regressions looked at the effect of fund characteristics on the returns.  
All of the regressions used year fixed effects to account for inter-year variations in returns.  All 
returns for firms with more than one fund in a given year are reported on a weighted average 
basis for the year.   
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In the first test, the fund’s current IRR regressed on the log of the fund’s size and the log 
of the fund’s sequence number.  The regression forms the equation: 
   IRRt = α + βLog(sizet) + δLog(sequencet) 
where size is equal to the total equity committed to the fund and the sequence number is the 
number representing the origination order of the funds from the same firm.  The next regression 
used the log(size) and log(sequence) independent variables again and also implements the 
squared functions of both variables.  The second regression is represented by the equation: 
   IRRt = α + βLog(sizet)2 + δLog(sequencet)2 
By squaring the independent variables, we are able to look at the functional form of this 
relationship.  We then repeated the regressions using the equations above, but this time we 
implement firm fixed effects to see the results of the characteristics on funds within the same 
firm.   
The second part of Kaplan and Schoar’s (2003) analysis incorporated the lagged returns 
into the regression.  Again, all of the regressions incorporated year fixed effects into the analysis; 
however, firm fixed effects cannot be used in conjunction with a lagged return in the independent 
variable.  In the first regression, current returns represent the dependent variable while the return 
of the firm’s previous fund was used as the independent variable.  This was done to indicate 
weather prior performance is positively correlated with the current returns by obtaining a 
positive coefficient in the IRR t-1 independent variable.  The regression equation is: 
  IRRt = α + βIRR t-1 
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The next analysis followed the same methodology, but regresses current returns on the 
two previous funds from the same firm.  This will analyze the effect of the two previous funds on 
the current returns.  The empirical specification is as follows: 
   IRR t = α + βIRR t-1 + δIRR t-2 
In the final regression, second previous fund (IRRt-2) represents the only independent variable 
and is regressed into the current returns.  This will show us the correlation between the second 
previous fund and the current returns.  The empirical equation is: 
  IRRt = α + βIRR t-2 
 
 
VI. Results and Analysis 
Contingency Tables 
 Contingency tables were constructed using pairs of subsequent funds by the same firm.  
The first test compared the funds normalized ranking to the median ranking of their vintage year 
peers.  If a fund was rated above the median it was awarded a “win” rating and if it was at or 
below the median it was assigned a “loss”.  The pairs were then compiled into a contingency 
table, with a quadrant representing each possible scenario: win/win, win/lose, lose/win or 
lose/lose.  The null hypothesis is that the first ranking and second ranking are unrelated, giving 
an expected frequency in each cell of the matrix of one-quarter of the total number of pairs.  The 
tests were run on both gross and net numbers and at both the fund and firm level (described in 
Methodology Section).  The results are shown below. 
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FIRM LEVEL 
Division by Median - All Fund Years 
      
     Observed Frequencies     
   GROSS    NET    
    W L    W L   
  W 19 19  W 21 16   
  L 14 25  L 14 24   
           
     Expected      
     Frequencies      
    W L    W L   
  W 19.25 19.25  W 18.75 18.75   
  L 19.25 19.25  L 18.75 18.75   
  Total 77  Total 75   
  Chi-squared:  Gross 0.075656    
        Net 0.067341     
 
  
  
          FUND LEVEL 
         Division by Median - All Fund Years 
    
     Observed Frequencies      
   GROSS    NET    
    W L    W L   
  W 26 21  W 27 21   
  L 21 36  L 21 36   
           
     Expected      
     Frequencies      
    W L    W L   
  W 26.00 26.00  W 26.25 26.25   
  L 26.00 26.00  L 26.25 26.25   
   Total 104  Total 105  
  Chi-squared:  Gross 0.016309    
        Net 0.016556     
 
 At the firm level, the Chi-Squared statistic for all years was .0756, and .0673 for gross 
and net IRR, respectively.  This indicates there is a 7.56% chance of obtaining this distribution 
for gross IRR if the rankings are in fact independent.  The percentage decreased to a 6.73% 
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chance when using net IRR.  The null hypothesis of no correlation can then be rejected at the 
92% level for gross and the 93% level for net.  These are less significant findings than that of the 
previous thesis (Hahn 2003), where both scenarios were rejected at the 99% confidence level.    
 At the fund level, the chi-squared tests for all years based on gross and net IRR were 
.0163 and .0165, respectively.  This indicates that the null hypothesis of no correlation can be 
rejected at the 98% confidence interval for both cases.   Per Brown and Goetmann (1995), cross-
product ratios were calculated as well.  The results are consistent with the chi-squared test as the 
fund level results show a higher degree of persistence by rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
correlation at the 96% and 97% confidence level for gross and net returns, respectively. 
FUND LEVEL Ratio δln(CPR) log-odds Z-stat Significance 
GROSS 2.12 0.402 0.753 1.873 3.1%  Median  
NET 2.20 0.400 0.790 1.975 2.4% 
FIRM LEVEL Ratio δln(CPR) log-odds Z-stat Significance 
GROSS 1.79 0.466 0.580 1.246 10.6%  Median  
NET 2.25 0.472 0.811 1.716 4.3% 
 
The contingency tables were constructed using only the data from 1991-1997.  Theses 
funds are assumed to be fully invested, giving more reliability to their returns. 
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Firm Level 
Division by Median - 1991-1997 
      
     
Observed 
Frequencies      
   GROSS    NET    
    W L    W L   
  W 6 4  W 7 4   
  L 3 9  L 3 7   
           
     Expected      
     Frequencies      
    W L    W L   
  W 5.50 5.50  W 5.25 5.25   
  L 5.50 5.50  L 5.25 5.25   
   Total 22  Total 21  
  Chi-squared:  Gross 0.050699    
        Net 0.119141     
 
The chi-squared tests in the table above reject the null hypothesis of no correlation at the 94% 
confidence level.  The net results are not as significant; the null hypothesis can only be rejected 
at the 88% confidence interval and in deemed statistically insignificant. 
    
  
FUND LEVEL 
Division by Median - 1991 - 1997 
      
     
Observed 
Frequencies      
   GROSS    NET    
    W L    W L   
  W 11 5  W 11 6   
  L 2 14  L 3 12   
           
     Expected      
     Frequencies      
    W L    W L   
  W 8.00 8.00  W 8.00 8.00   
  L 8.00 8.00  L 8.00 8.00   
   Total 32  Total 32  
  Chi-squared:  Gross 0.000796    
        Net 0.009375     
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The results at the fund level show much more persistence than the firm level for the 
1991-1997 time period.  The null hypothesis of no correlation can be rejected at the 99% 
confidence level.  Cross-product ratios were calculated for the 1991-1997 as well.  The cross 
product ratios produce similar results to the chi-squared test.  The fund level results are stronger 
than the firm level and the gross results are stronger than the net.   All of the results significantly 
reject the null hypothesis of no correlation. 
 
FIRM LEVEL  
1991-1997 Ratio δln(CPR) log-odds Z-stat 
Normal 
Dist Significance
GROSS 4.50 0.928 1.504 1.621 0.947 5.3%  Median  
NET 4.08 0.932 1.407 1.509 0.934 6.6% 
FUND LEVEL  
1991-1997 Ratio δln(CPR) log-odds Z-stat 
Normal 
Dist Significance
GROSS 15.40 0.929 2.734 2.945 0.998 0.2%  Median  
NET 5.24 0.817 1.656 2.027 0.979 2.1% 
 
Additional analysis was performed awarding a “win” to those funds with a ranking in the 
top quartile (normalized ranking greater than or equal to .75) and a “lose” was given to the funds 
with a ranking in the bottom quartile (normalized ranking less than or equal to .25).  If a firm 
earned a ranking in the middle quartiles (greater than .25 or less than .75), it was assigned a 
rating of NS.  Only the pairs with a first fund ranking in the top or bottom quartile (win or lose) 
were paired with subsequent funds, as the objective was to analyze the persistence in the extreme 
performers.  This criterion reduced the sample size at the fund level to 59 for gross and 64 for net 
and 43 and 42 at the firm level for gross and net, respectively.  The results are shown below.  
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FIRM LEVEL 
Division by Quartile 
\     
     Observed Frequencies      
   GROSS    NET    
    W L    W L   
  W 9 12  W 9 13   
  L 14 8  L 16 6   
           
     Expected      
     Frequencies      
    W L    W L   
  W 5.38 16.13  W 5.50 16.50   
  L 16.13 5.38  L 16.50 5.50   
   Total 43  Total 44  
  Chi-squared:  Gross 0.024456    
        Net 0.081723     
 
      
FUND LEVEL 
Division by Quartile 
        
     Observed Frequencies     
   GROSS    NET    
    W L    W L   
  W 10 14  W 12 17   
  L 24 11  L 23 12   
           
     Expected      
     Frequencies      
    W L    W L   
  W 7.38 22.13  W 8.00 24.00   
  L 22.13 7.38  L 24.00 8.00   
   Total 59  Total 64  
  Chi-squared:  Gross 0.015500    
        Net 0.013646     
 
 The results of the chi-squared test for the Firm level are .0244 and .0817 for gross and 
net, respectively.  These results reject the null hypothesis of no correlation at the 97% and 91% 
confidence level, respectively.  As was the case at the median level, the results at the fund level 
are much more significant.  The null hypothesis can be rejected at the 98% confidence level for 
both gross and net returns.  It is interesting to note that, for gross returns at the firm level, 
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evidence of persistence is much higher in the extremes (top and bottom quartile) than at the 
median.   
The test was also performed using the top third (NR greater than or equal to .66) and the 
bottom third (NR less than or equal to .33) as the win/lose criteria.  The results are shown below. 
  
        
FIRM LEVEL 
Division by Thirds        
     Observed Frequencies     
   GROSS    NET    
    W L    W L   
  W 13 15  W 13 15   
  L 15 12  L 16 10   
           
     Expected      
     Frequencies      
    W L    W L   
  W 9.17 18.33  W 9.00 18.00   
  L 18.33 9.17  L 18.00 9.00   
   Total 55  Total 54  
  Chi-squared:  Gross 0.054710    
        Net 0.106117     
 
        
FUND LEVEL 
Division by Thirds        
     Observed Frequencies     
   GROSS    NET    
    W L    W L   
  W 16 18  W 16 21   
  L 24 17  L 24 17   
           
     Expected      
     Frequencies      
    W L    W L   
  W 12.50 25.00  W 13.00 26.00   
  L 25.00 12.50  L 26.00 13.00   
   Total 75  Total 78  
  Chi-squared:  Gross 0.031972    
        Net 0.081313     
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The Chi-squared results are .054 and .106 for gross and net firm level returns, respectively.  The 
null hypothesis of no persistence can be rejected at the 94% level for gross and is insignificant 
for the net returns (89%).  The chi-squared test results for the fund level analysis are .0319 and 
.0813 for net, allowing the null hypothesis to be rejected at the 96% and 91% confidence levels, 
respectively.  These results are consistent with prior contingency tables.  There seems to be a 
stronger level of persistence at the fund level versus the firm level.  There also appears to be 
stronger evidence of persistence in the gross returns when compared to the net results.  This may 
be attributed to the fee structure, where most of the abnormal returns are being absorbed by the 
manager, which is typical of a standard carried interest structure set up to compensate the 
manager for good performance. 
 It is also interesting to see where the persistence occurred.  When analyzing persistence 
with win/lose based upon the median, essentially all the occurrences above the expected 
frequency are located in the lose/lose column.  This is consistent with what has been found in 
mutual funds, with the highest level of persistence found in the poorly performing funds.  This 
demonstrates that the market fails to consistently discipline under performers.  This phenomenon 
forces the question of how the under performing funds are able to raise subsequent funds.  Is it 
due to salesmanship?  Are they constantly selling another strategy?  Is there too long of a return 
lag for the market to realize the under performance and discipline a firm?  These questions 
present another interesting study in itself.   It is also interesting to note that when there is strong 
evidence signifying that persistence is correlated to the individual firms.  Very few firms (at both 
the median fund and firm level) that showed persistence results (win/win or lose/lose) and were 
able to raise additional funds were likely to repeat the results.  This differs from a previous study 
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on the mutual fund industry, where persistence was found to be correlated across managers, 
signifying heard behavior (Brown and Goetzmann 2005).   
 When analyzing persistence in the extremes (quartiles and thirds), the data produces 
different results.  The results show the probability of win/win and lose/lose to be virtually equal 
and persistent.  This illustrates that performance in the extremes is just as likely to be from 
exceptional performance than from poor performance.    
   
Firm Level – Median  Fund Level - Top Quartile 
  Gross   Net  Gross  Net 
  Actual Expected   Actual Expected  Actual Expected  Actual Expected 
WW 19 19.25  21 18.75  26 26 27 26.25
LL 25 19.25  24 18.75  36 26  36 26.25
           
Firm Level – Top Quartile  Fund Level - Top Quartile 
  Gross   Net  Gross  Net 
  Actual Expected   Actual Expected  Actual Expected  Actual Expected 
WW 9 5.38  9 5.38  10 7.38 12 8
LL 8 5.38   6 5.38  11 7.38  12 8
           
Firm Level - Top Third  Fund Level - Top Quartile 
  Gross   Net  Gross  Net 
  Actual Expected   Actual Expected  Actual Expected  Actual Expected 
WW 13 9.17  13 9  16 12.5 16 13
LL 12 9.17   10 9  17 12.5  17 13
 
Regression Analysis 
In the first part of our regression analysis, we replicated some of the tests that were done 
in the previous thesis (Hahn 2003), using the updated data.   The regressions were performed on 
both gross and net rankings, at the fund and firm level (described in methodology section).  The 
firm level results provide the best comparison to the results achieved in the prior thesis, although 
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the methodologies are not exact.  These regressions used the ranking of the funds from the 
previous section as the indicator of performance.8   
The first test regressed a fund’s rank on a dummy variable, indicating if the fund 
represents the firm’s first fund.  The number of observations available for analysis has increased 
from 110 to 128 at the firm level, and 145 at the fund level.  The results of this regression show 
the effect of prior experience on a fund’s ranking.  
FIRM LEVEL - All Years  FUND LEVEL - All Years 
  Gross Net    Gross Net 
Adjusted R2 -0.005 -0.007  Adjusted R2 -0.001 -0.006
First Fund DV -0.03 -0.02  First Fund DV -0.05 -0.02
     t-stat -0.56 -0.37       t-stat -0.95 -0.44
     p-value 57.44% 71.35%       p-value 34.53% 66.33%
Intercept 0.52 0.50  Intercept 0.53 0.52
     t-stat 11.69 11.06       t-stat 12.16 11.73
     p-value 0.00% 0.00%       p-value 0.00% 0.00%
 
The results of the regression are similar to those achieved in the prior thesis (Hahn 2003).  
None of the variables are significant, but as was pointed out in the prior thesis, the coefficients 
are negative.  This suggests that firms that outperform peers on one fund are able to raise a 
subsequent fund, but are unlikely to outperform again.   
The next regression regresses a fund’s rank on the firm’s previous fund’s rank.    The null 
hypothesis is: A fund’s ranking is independent of the firm’s prior fund’s performance.  The 
results are summarized in the table below.  
 
 
  
                                                 
8 The rankings are uniformly distributed, versus normal distribution, may provide a degree of error in the results.  A 
few of the regressions were tested by running a “orbit probit regression” to correct for the distribution and the results 
were not significantly different. 
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FIRM LEVEL - All Years  FUND LEVEL - All Years 
  Gross Net    Gross Net 
Adjusted R2 0.043 0.031 Adjusted R2 0.041 0.016
LR 0.21 0.19 LR 0.20 0.14
     t-stat 2.11 1.83      t-stat 2.32 1.62
     p-value 3.86% 7.15%      p-value 2.21% 10.74%
Intercept 0.38 0.40 Intercept 0.39 0.43
     t-stat 6.35 6.44      t-stat 7.79 8.38
     p-value 0.00% 0.00%      p-value 0.00% 0.00%
  
The results indicate that the null hypothesis of a fund’s current performance is independent of 
prior fund performance can be rejected at the 97% and 95% confidence level for fund and firm 
level gross rankings, respectively.  The net results are not as strong, with the fund level rejecting 
the hypothesis at the 92% confidence level, and insignificant at the fund level (89%).  Again, this 
indicates a weaker relationship between previous and future fund performance based on net 
ranking measures.  It is also important to note that the adjusted R2 from the current analysis 
(4.3%) is significantly lower than the adjusted R2 reported in the previous thesis (24%).  Results 
for 1991-1997 were similar (not reported).   
Another regression was performed using the prior ranking of the manager’s two previous 
funds as the independent variables.  The results for firm and fund level are shown below. 
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FIRM LEVEL - All Years  FUND LEVEL - All Years 
  Gross Net    Gross Net 
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.018  Adjusted R2 0.057 0.019 
LLR -0.04 0.07  LLR -0.08 -0.06 
     t-stat -0.32 0.50       t-stat -0.79 -0.57 
     p-value 75.33% 61.79%       p-value 43.32% 57.25% 
LR 0.33 0.24  LR 0.27 0.22 
     t-stat 2.23 1.51       t-stat 2.49 1.84 
     p-value 3.10% 13.76%       p-value 1.51% 6.96% 
Intercept 0.34 0.33  Intercept 0.41 0.43 
     t-stat 3.50 3.14       t-stat 5.87 5.81 
     p-value 0.11% 0.32%       p-value 0.00% 0.00% 
 
The results indicate that the previous fund’s ranking (LR) has a statistically significant positive 
effect on the current fund for all tests except firm level net returns.  In the prior thesis, the second 
previous fund’s ranking (LLR) was statistically significant and had a negative coefficient.  The 
LLR coefficient in the current analysis is not statistically significant at any level, but remains 
negative.  The coefficients imply that a firm’s subsequent fund will perform well, but the third 
fund will revert to the mean. 
 Due to the investment strategy of opportunity funds, it may take several years after 
inception to clearly define fund performance.  Therefore, it would be difficult for an investor to 
make a decision based on persistence in the early years of a fund’s existence.  The final 
regression uses makes all possible pairs of funds separated by at least a five-year lag. 
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FIRM LEVEL - All Years  FUND LEVEL - All Years 
  Gross Net    Gross Net 
Adjusted R2 -0.028 0.077  Adjusted R2 -0.016 0.008 
5-Y LR -0.02 0.26  5-Y LR 0.03 0.13 
     t-stat -0.19 1.96       t-stat 0.32 1.20 
     p-value 85.39% 5.83%       p-value 75.26% 23.36% 
Intercept 0.46 0.33  Intercept 0.46 0.48 
     t-stat 6.01 4.87       t-stat 7.51 7.52 
     p-value 0.00% 0.00%       p-value 0.00% 0.00% 
   
These regression results are statistically insignificant, except for firm level net ranking.  This 
coefficient is significant and indicates a positive correlation.  The analysis in the prior thesis 
paired a fund with the most recent subsequent fund with at least a five-year lag in between, 
which resulted in 13 pairs.  Coefficients for both the gross and net results were statistically 
significant and negative.  The current analysis is a slight variation of the previous regression, by 
making all possible pairs with at least a five-year lag.  This methodology resulted in 58 pairs. 
 The next set of regression analysis employs a methodology previously performed in a 
working paper by Kaplan and Schoar (2003) on a private equity returns.  It explores how fund 
returns correlate with partnership and fund characteristics and tests for persistence in the returns.  
The dependent variable in all cases is the IRR-based returns for the fund.  In cases where funds 
started more than one fund in a vintage year, a weighted average of the return is taken.  
Independent variables consist of size (equity commitments to the fund), sequence number (the 
order of funds started within the same firm) and historical lagged returns.  Results are shown in 
the table below.  Year fixed effects are used in all calculations to adjust for large inter-year 
variations in returns. 
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Dependent Variable - Gross IRR       
column 1 2 3 4 5 
Log (Size) 0.0382 0.0508 0.0374 -0.1098 -0.46078 
     Std. Error 0.0448 0.1171 0.0448 0.0951 0.4299 
     P-Value 0.396 0.665 0.406 0.253 0.288 
        
Log (size)2  -.0013   0.0719 
     Std. Error  0.0269   0.0877 
     P-Value  0.96   0.671 
        
Log (Sequence)     .0215 0.0815  0.0444 -0.0305 
     Std. Error 0.0960 0.2518  0.283 0.3047 
     P-Value 0.823 0.747  0.876 0.92 
        
Log (Sequence)2 -0.1693   0.222 
     Std. Error  0.3539   0.4427 
     P-Value  0.652   0.618 
        
First Dummy   0.0026    
     Std. Error   0.0486    
     P-Value   0.956    
        
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 .49 0.48 0.49 0.66 0.65 
N of Observ. 128 128 128 128 128 
 
The first three columns show the cross-sectional relationship between fund performance 
and fund characteristics, without firm fixed effects.  Column (1) uses log(size) and log(sequence) 
as the independent variables.  Neither of the point estimates on the variables is significant.  
Nonetheless, the estimates show that larger funds have higher sequence numbers and realize 
higher returns.  These coefficients are similar results to those achieved in the Kaplan and Schoar 
private equity analysis.   
 In column (2), the squared terms of log(Size) and log(Sequence) are included as 
coefficient on the independent variables to analyze the functional form of this relation.  The point 
estimate on the linear term of log(size) increases when the when the log(size)2 function is 
included and the analysis, and the coefficient on the log(size) squared function is negative.  
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Although they are not significant, the coefficients on the independent variables signify a concave 
relationship between fund size and performance.  This indicates that larger funds will have better 
performance until they become too large, at which time their returns will decline.  The results for 
sequence numbers portray the same concave relationship as size.  These findings are similar to 
Kaplan and Schoar’s (2003) findings with private equity funds, but unlike our results, theirs 
showed statistical significance. 
 The results in column 3 use a dummy variable to show the effect of having a previous 
fund on the current returns.  The coefficient is insignificant, but slightly positive.  A similar 
regression performed above using rankings was insignificant, but slightly negative. 
In column (4) we use the same independent variables in column (1), but we add firm 
fixed effects.  Again, none of the coefficients are statistically significant, but results are similar to 
Kaplan and Schoar (2003) when analyzing the coefficients.  In the linear specifications in 
column (4), the sign on the fund size coefficient variable becomes negative [from results in 
column (1)] while the sequence number coefficient does not.  The fund size result indicates that 
while larger funds have higher returns [as shown in column (1)], when a firm raises a subsequent 
fund that is larger, the returns on the subsequent funds will decline.  The sequence number result 
stays positive with the firm fixed effects turned on.  This indicates if the same manager raises a 
subsequent fund the returns will increase, so long as the subsequent fund does not grow in size.  
 Column (5) repeats the regression from column (2), but with firm fixed effects turned on.  
The results indicate a convex relationship with both size and sequence.  These findings are in 
line with the previous results.  These results infer that fund returns will decrease as additional 
funds of increased size are raised.   Again, the coefficients were similar to those found by Kaplan 
and Schoar, but our results lack statistical significance. 
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  As noted in the Kaplan and Schoar (2003) study, the first sign of persistence is seen in the 
increase in the R2 with the addition of firm fixed effects in columns (4) and (5).  The R2 from 
the regressions in columns (1) and (3) increase by 35% when the firm’s fixed effects were 
included in columns (4) and (5).  The outcome on including the firm fixed effects shows that 
partnerships vary systematically in their returns.  
It should be noted that none of our variables in the replication of the Kaplan and Schoar 
(2003) analysis above were significant.  However, the results and implication of the coefficients 
were very similar to their findings.  Private equity is a much more mature industry than that of 
real estate opportunity funds.  Therefore, the private equity study had many more data points 
(746), which were of higher certainty, due to the fact that the data was limited to funds in the 
later stages of their cash flow life cycle.   
 The next part of the Kaplan and Schoar (2003) study implemented lagged returns into the 
regression to test for persistence.   Several regressions using lagged IRR from the previous two 
funds were performed.  Year fixed effects are implemented in every regression. Due to the fact 
that a lagged IRR is used in the right hand side variable, we cannot simultaneously control for 
firm fixed effects.  The results of the regression are shown below. 
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Dependent Variable – Gross IRR     
       column 1 2 3 4 
IRR t-1 0.499 0.867  0.782 
     Std. Error 0.269 0.452  0.492 
     P-Value 0.069 0.065  0.123 
       
IRR t-2  -0.299 -0.354 -0.434 
     Std. Error  0.522 0.823 0.587 
     P-Value  0.572 0.669 0.465 
       
Log (Sequence)   -0.247 
     Std. Error    0.444 
     P-Value    0.581 
       
Log (Size)    0.040 
     Std. Error    0.117 
     P-Value    0.732 
       
       
Firm FE no no no no 
Year FE yes yes yes yes 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.52 0.26 0.50 
N of Observ. 77 44 44 44 
 
In Column (1) of the table above, IRR is regressed onto the IRR of the previous fund.  
The coefficient is statistically significant and positive.  The point estimate is 0.54, which implies 
a fund with a 1-unit higher performance in the current fund is associated with a 54 basis point 
increase in the subsequent fund.  These results are consistent with the findings in the private 
equity industry and with the prior regressions based on ranking.   
In column (2), the IRR for the previous two funds are included as right hand side 
variables.  The results produce a significant positive coefficient on the previous fund (LR) and an 
insignificant negative coefficient on the second previous fund (LLR).  This is consistent with the 
results of the prior regressions run on rankings.  The negative sign of the second lagged variable 
suggests that the fund may be mean reverting.   
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Due to the negative sign on the increased size and second previous fund coefficients, 
additional tests were performed to determine the effect of growth on the returns.  A growth factor 
was calculated and regressed with size and lagged IRR.  The growth coefficient was negative, 
but it did not remove the negative sign from the log(size) coefficient.  An additional regression 
was ran with log(size), lagged IRR, and a variable that interacted lag IRR with a dummy variable 
set at growth of 1.75 times. These results were similar to the other regression.  This leads one to 
believe that growth may have a negative effect on the returns, but it is not the only factor 
contributing to the negative size coefficient.     
 The regressions were also performed on the net return numbers.  The results are similar to 
that of those found using the gross number.  There is one notable difference, however.  The 
log(size) coefficient in column (4) below is negative and significant.  The coefficients in the net 
and gross regressions are similar, but the net result is significant.  The fund characteristic 
regressions are summarized in the tables below. 
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Dependent Variable - Net IRR    
column 1 2 3 4 5 
Log (Size) 0.0097 -0.0397 0.01333 -0.1299 -0.4917 
     Std. Error 0.0353 0.1367 0.0346 0.0698 0.317 
     P-Value 0.783 0.772 0.702 0.068 0.126 
      
Log (size)2  0.012   0.0752 
     Std. Error  0.0309   0.0649 
     P-Value  0.698   0.251 
      
Log (Sequence) 0.0394 0.0984  -0.1581 -0.1979 
     Std. Error 0.0717 0.193  0.2051 0.2215 
     P-Value 0.55 0.611  0.444 0.375 
      
Log (Sequence)2 -0.967   0.1099 
     Std. Error  0.2736   0.3304 
     P-Value  0.724   0.74 
      
First Dummy   -0.0242   
     Std. Error   0.0371   
     P-Value   0.515   
      
Firm FE no No no yes Yes 
Year FE yes Yes yes yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.42 0.41 0.49 0.63 0.63 
N of Observ. 125 125 125 125 125 
 
  
The regressions were also performed on the net lagged returns in search of evidence of 
persistence (not reported).  The results were very insignificant and showed no signs of 
persistence.  This is similar to the findings in a majority of the tests where evidence of 
persistence is more prevalent in the gross versus the net returns. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 This thesis confirmed many of the findings from Cathy C. Hahn’s thesis: “Real Estate 
Opportunity Funds: Past Fund Performance as an Indicator of Subsequent Fund Performance” 
(2003) with regard to persistence in real estate opportunity fund returns.  The returns were tested 
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for persistence through the construction and analysis of contingency tables and regression 
analysis.  Although the level of certainty may have decreased in some of the tests performed, the 
overall results remained statistically significant and showed strong evidence of performance 
persistence.  The persistence was evident when the analysis was performed on the entire 
database, and when it was restricted to funds with a vintage year between 1991-1997.  Consistent 
with the prior thesis, the current tests found the performance to generally be less persistent in the 
net returns.  This fact leads us to believe that firms absorb the excess return achieved by the way 
of fees.   
 Through the construction of contingency tables and analysis with the chi-squared and 
cross-product ratio tests, strong evidence of performance persistence was found.  The study 
revealed that persistence found using the median ranking as the win/lose divider is weighted 
toward the poorly performing funds, which is consistent with prior studies performed on 
persistence in mutual funds [eg. Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Shukla and Trzcinka 
(1994), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Carhart et al. 1996)].  A higher degree of persistence was 
also found when analyzing funds consistently finishing in the top or bottom quartile in relation to 
their vintage year peers.     Unlike the median results, the persistence in the extremes was 
represented by virtually an equal number of persistent winners and losers.  When analyzing the 
output, it was also apparent that the persistence was firm specific.  Regardless of whether a fund 
was a winner or a loser, they were able to raise subsequent funds and were likely to repeat their 
performance.  This differs from a previous study on the mutual fund industry, where persistence 
was found to be correlated across managers, signifying herd behavior (Brown and Goetzmann 
2005).   It is difficult to understand why the market does not discipline the funds for poor 
performance.  Are the subsequent funds raised purely through salesmanship?  Are they 
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constantly selling new strategies or outlooks?  Are subsequent funds raised in a time interval 
where the previous fund’s returns are not yet realized?  This presents an interesting topic for 
future study.   
Regression analysis was also performed on the fund rankings, as was performed in the 
prior thesis.  The results showed evidence of strong persistence between the current and 
subsequent fund, and a negative, yet insignificant coefficient when including the returns of the 
second previous fund.  Regressions were also performed on ranking of funds with at least a five-
year lag in between funds, however the results were insignificant.   
An additional analysis was performed to analyze characteristics of fund performance, as 
well as to test the appearance of persistence in the returns.  The tests were modeled after an 
analysis performed by Kaplan and Schoar (2003) on the private equity industry.  The 
methodology included a more rigorous regression analysis than previously performed, using fund 
IRR as the dependent variable and fund characteristics and lagged returns as the independent 
variables.  Year-and-firm fixed effects were also used to control to account for variations in 
returns.     
 The majority of results from our version of the study were statistically insignificant, but 
strikingly similar to the significant results found by Kaplan and Schoar.  The coefficients in 
imply that the bigger funds perform better, but if the same firm raises a subsequent fund that 
grows in size, it’s will negatively effect returns.  The sequence variable was positively correlated 
with performance, which indicates that if a firm raises additional funds, returns will increase if 
they hold the size constant.    
The next step of the analysis tested for persistence in the returns.  When fund IRR was 
regressed on lagged IRR from the previous fund, the results showed a positive correlation that 
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was statistically significant.   When the returns from the previous two funds were included as 
right hand side variables, it produced a significant positive coefficient on the previous fund (LR) 
and an insignificant negative coefficient on the second previous fund (LLR).  The negative sign 
of the second lagged variable suggests that the fund may be mean reverting.  This finding is 
different from the private equity results, but consistent with the prior regressions performed on 
normalized rank in the prior and current theses.  This could be related to the fact that superior 
performance presumes that fund managers have the ability to pick undervalued investments.    
The market in which to find these investments is specialized, competitive, and potentially 
geographically constrained.  In this environment, it is likely to be difficult to maintain continued 
superior performance, as the size of the fund expands and may lead to mean reversion in 
performance.   Additionally, management structure becomes increasingly more important as the 
size of the organization grows. 
  Although a vast majority of our findings using the Kaplan and Schoar (2003) 
methodology were statistically insignificant, the resulting coefficients from the regressions told a 
similar story to that found in private equity.  The private equity industry has a much longer 
history and a much more comprehensive database of historical returns than that of real estate 
opportunity funds.  The Kaplan and Schoar (2003) study was performed on a data set of 746 
funds when regressing on fund characteristics and 225 observations when using returns of two 
prior funds as independent variables.  These observations only include funds that  have matured 
and have realized a majority of the cash flows, making them less reliant on the manager’s 
projections.  The data used for the analysis in this thesis had 128 observations when regressing 
funds characteristics, and 44 observations when regressing the prior two years’ returns.  Of these 
observations used, only small portions of them are based on realized returns, allowing the returns 
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to be over estimated by overly optimistic managers.  A minor abnormality in such a small sample 
size can have a significant impact on the findings.  As the opportunity fund industry continues to 
grow, mature, and standardize the reporting process, the reliability of the data and subsequent 
results will increase dramatically.  It would be enlightening to run these tests again in the future 
using more observations and seasoned data.  We would expect the majority of the findings to 
hold true and show more statistical significance when the size of the database increases in the 
future.       
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VIII. Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fund LEVEL.- PARAMETRIC REGRESSIONS based on Normalized Rankings
Summary: Fund Level GROSS IRR existence of previous fund Summary: Fund Level NET IRR existence of previous fund
Regression Statistics Regression Statistics
R2 0.006 R2 0.001
Adjusted R2 -0.001 Adjusted R2 -0.006
Standard Error 0.313 Standard Error 0.314
Observations 145 Observations 146
Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.53 12.16 0.00% 0.45 0.62 Intercept 0.52 11.73 0.00% 0.43 0.60
First Fund -0.05 -0.95 34.53% -0.16 0.06 First Fund -0.02 -0.44 66.33% -0.13 0.08
Sumary: Fund Level GROSS IRR, One lag Sumary: Fund Level NET IRR, One lag
Regression Statistics Regression Statistics
R2 0.050 R2 0.025
Adjusted R2 0.041 Adjusted R2 0.016
Standard Error 0.287 Standard Error 0.294
Observations 104 Observations 104
Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.39 7.79 0.00% 0.29 0.49 Intercept 0.43 8.38 0.00 0.33 0.53
LR 0.20 2.32 2.21% 0.03 0.38 LR 0.14 1.62 0.11 -0.03 0.32
Sumary: Fund Level GROSS IRR Two prior funds (2 lags) Sumary: Fund Level NET IRR Two prior funds (2 lags)
Regression Statistics Regression Statistics
R2 0.083 R2 0.046
Adjusted R2 0.057 Adjusted R2 0.019
Standard Error 0.264 Standard Error 0.291
Observations 73 Observations 73
Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.41 5.87 0.00% 0.27 0.54 Intercept 0.43 5.81 0.00% 0.28 0.58
LLR -0.08 -0.79 43.32% -0.27 0.12 LLR -0.06 -0.57 57.25% -0.28 0.16
LR 0.27 2.49 1.51% 0.05 0.48 LR 0.22 1.84 6.96% -0.02 0.46
Summary: Fund Level GROSS IRR 5 yrs or more lags Summary: Fund Level NET IRR 5 yrs or more lags
Regression Statistics Regression Statistics
R2 0.002 R2 0.026
Adjusted R2 -0.016 Adjusted R2 0.008
Standard Error 0.269 Standard Error 0.283
Observations 58 Observations 57
Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.46 7.51 0.00% 0.34 0.59 Intercept 0.48 7.52 0.00% 0.35 0.61
LR 0.03 0.32 75.26% -0.18 0.24 LR 0.13 1.20 23.36% -0.09 0.35
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FIRM LEVEL.- PARAMETRIC REGRESSIONS
Summary: GROSS IRR, FIRM level existance of previous fund Summary: NET IRR, FIRM level existance of previous fund
Regression Statistics Regression Statistics
R2 0.003 R2 0.001
Adjusted R2 -0.005 Adjusted R2 -0.007
Standard Error 0.317 Standard Error 0.324
Observations 128 Observations 128
Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.52 11.69 0.00% 0.43 0.61 Intercept 0.50 11.06 0.00% 0.41 0.59
AR -0.03 -0.56 57.44% -0.15 0.08 AR -0.02 -0.37 71.35% -0.14 0.09
Summary: GROSS IRR Firm Level One Lag Summary: NET IRR Firm Level One Lag
Regression Statistics Regression Statistics
R2 0.056 R2 0.044
Adjusted R2 0.043 Adjusted R2 0.031
Standard Error 0.285 Standard Error 0.294
Observations 77 Observations 75
Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.38 6.35 0.00% 0.26 0.50 Intercept 0.40 6.44 0.00% 0.27 0.52
AR 0.21 2.11 3.86% 0.01 0.42 AR 0.19 1.83 7.15% -0.02 0.40
Summary: Firm Level GROSS IRR: two lags (trios) Summary: Firm Level NET IRR: two lags (trios)
Regression Statistics Regression Statistics
R2 0.109 R2 0.064
Adjusted R2 0.065 Adjusted R2 0.018
Standard Error 0.265 Standard Error 0.295
Observations 44.00 Observations 44.00
Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.34 3.50 0.11% 0.14 0.53 Intercept 0.33 3.14 0.32% 0.12 0.54
LLR -0.04 -0.32 75.33% -0.29 0.21 LLR 0.07 0.50 61.79% -0.21 0.34
LR 0.33 2.23 3.10% 0.03 0.62 LR 0.24 1.51 13.76% -0.08 0.55
Summary GROSS IRR, +5 yrs lag. FIRM level Summary NET IRR, +5 yrs lag. FIRM level
Regression Statistics Regression Statistics
R2 0.001 R2 0.104
Adjusted R2 -0.028 Adjusted R2 0.077
Standard Error 0.276 Standard Error 0.283
Observations 36 Observations 35
Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Coefficients t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95%
Intercept 0.46 6.01 0.00% 0.30 0.61 Intercept 0.33 4.87 0.00% 0.19 0.47
LR -0.02 -0.19 85.39% -0.29 0.24 LR 0.26 1.96 5.83% -0.01 0.53
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